PLAN gate review · generated 2026-06-08
Tier 0 signed attestation becomes the boot floor.
The plan converts Constitutional Clause and Safety Rider obligations into a signed policy, signed runtime fingerprint, signed release attestation, and a verifier that stops customer runtime startup before dispatch, memory, package loading, or tenant workers.
Artifact Relationship
The runtime is allowed to boot only when the release attestation binds the policy manifest hash and runtime manifest hash, and the verifier proves the release directory still matches both.
Policy Manifest
Derived from canonical governance sources and protected paths.
FORGE.md §12.2 FORGE.md §12.4 .forge/machines/*.yamlRuntime Manifest
Fingerprints package set, verifier entry, boot hook, runtime files, and capability set.
release id artifact root hash hook chainRelease Attestation
Signs policy hash, runtime hash, release id, key set, revocation list, and panel receipts.
Grok mandatory 2 non-author approversVerifier Contract
Defines trusted inputs, canonicalization, stderr, exit codes, revocation, quorum, and no break-glass.
fail closed structured stderrBoot-Time Chain
The plan places verification ahead of every customer-runtime capability that can observe or mutate tenant state.
Seven Fail-Closed Classes
Policy Missing
TIER0_POLICY_MISSING covers absent policy, source entry, extract, key-set, or revocation input.
Policy Hash
TIER0_POLICY_HASH_MISMATCH catches weakened or substituted governance and FSM content.
Runtime Hash
TIER0_RUNTIME_HASH_MISMATCH catches altered runtime files, verifier, hook, package set, or capabilities.
Attestation Missing
TIER0_ATTESTATION_MISSING covers absent, unreadable, schema-invalid, or release-mismatched attestation.
Signature Invalid
TIER0_SIGNATURE_INVALID rejects payload, key, algorithm, or signature mismatch.
Quorum Insufficient
TIER0_QUORUM_INSUFFICIENT requires Grok plus at least two other valid non-author approvers.
Revoked Key
TIER0_REVOKED_KEY fails any signer key present in the effective revocation list.
Operator Signal
Every class maps to structured stderr and a non-zero exit. No warning-only mode is planned.
Implementation Coverage Plan
New Modules
manifest-loader.tsvalidates schemas and safe paths.signature.tscanonicalizes and verifies signed payloads.verifier.tsorchestrates the fail-closed chain.
Tests
- one direct unit test per public failure class.
- synthetic valid release fixture.
- hook and CLI failure propagation tests.
Coverage Targets
- 90 percent line coverage on
forge-core/src/tier0/. - 85 percent branch coverage on
forge-core/src/tier0/. - scoped assertion against soft-fail shell idioms.
Review Boundary
Self-Review Exclusion
Codex authored this PLAN and is the canonical implementer for the security-hardening sprint. Codex may be recorded as author provenance, but it cannot be counted as an approving reviewer for this PLAN or authored sections.
PLAN to DESIGN should require operator approval after visual review plus Grok-mandatory convergence evidence.
Plan Review Findings
Good
- Preserves the architecture rule that customer runtimes carry derived policy rather than operator docs verbatim.
- Separates schema, loader, signature, verifier, CLI, hook, and runbook concerns cleanly.
- Names exact public failure classes and maps each to tests.
Bad
- The PLAN intentionally defers hosted KMS and transparency logging; key lifecycle risk remains until dependent sprints land.
- The current track checkpoint in the workspace names another sprint, so FSM transition must be handled carefully.
Ugly
- Canonical fragment extraction can become brittle if heading text changes; the DESIGN should specify stable selectors and fallback behavior.
- Attestation canonicalization is security-critical and should be kept small enough for reviewers to inspect line by line.
Questions Closed By Plan
- Break-glass: none.
- Boot failure: non-zero exit with structured stderr.
- Review authority: Grok mandatory; Codex author does not approve authored sections.